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1. SUMMARY: The question presented is whether Minnesota is 
empowered by Congress to impose a personal property tax on a mobile --------
home owned by a Chippewa Indian and situated upon Indian land held -
~,~ [ !:/The previous memo, concluding that the petn was jurisdictionally 
~~.~~~ untimel~drawn. The clerk's office has verified that the 
~ ~~ Minn SC's judgment was not entered until April 10, 1975, which date 
/,r brings the petn, filed July 7, within the 90-day period. That the 
opinion was dated March 28 does not control. 
( -2-
in trust by the U.S. for the tribe. Affirming the trial court, 
the Minn. SC upheld the tax as authorized by Congress. 
2. FACTS: Petr, an enrolled member of the Chippewa Tribe, 
organized and recognized as such under federal law, has since 
1971 owned and resided in a mobile home located within the Greater 
Leech Lake Indian Reservation, which land is held jn trust by the 
U.S. for the tribe. The mobile home is permanently connected to 
water, sewer, and electric service. Resp's treasurer assessed 
personal property taxes against petr upon the mobile home for 
part of 1971 and all of 1972, totalling some $150. Petr's state 
declaratory judgment action asserted tax immunity under federal 
Indian law. The trial court, upon stipulated facts (including 
that the mobile home was personalty),found that the authority to ----------
tax Indian personalty was extended by Congress to Minnesota (and 
----~----- .....,.~ 
its subdivisions) by Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4 (Aug. 15, 1953), 
codified at E" s ~ c. § 13 0 subsectjon (a) of which states 
that "those civil laws [of the listed States, includjng Minnesota] 
that are of general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian 
I 
country as they have elsewhere within the [listed States]." 
y 
The Minn. SC (Yetka; en bane), affirming, reasoned that P.L. 280's 
~
1/Pub. L. 280, §§ 2 and 4 respectively, grant crjminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indian adjudication to state courts; § 2 is 
codified at 18 u.s.c. § 1162. The entire act is reproduced and 
attached. 
·~; . . 
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extension to the named States of criminal and civil jurisdiction 
over Indian adjudication, together with the explicit language 
quoted above, constituted the first, important step in Congress' 
plan to "assimilate" Indians into modern society, a reading 
supported by the legislative history. The quoted language should 
thus be read as plainly embracing general taxing power over 
Indians and Indian property and enterprises within the reservation; 
and it is the kind of "express" statutory authorjty required under 
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 177-179 (1973), 
and there found wanting. That the quoted language within § 1360 (a) 
is a general grant of taxing power is confirmed by the excepting 
language of§ 1360(b): 
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the 
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any 
real or personal property, includjng water 
rights, belonging to any Indian tribe, band, 
or community that is held in trust by the 
United States or is subject to a restriction 
against alienation imposed by the United 
States. . .. 
Section 1360(a) must include the general power to tax, for other-
~ 
wise§ 1360(b) is superfluous as a limitation on a non-existent 
power. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Within the "backdrop" of the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine, McClanahan, 411 U.S., at 172, express 
Congressional authority for Minn. to tax Indians on Indian land 
does not exist: (1) the treaty creating the Leech Lake reservation 
-4-
for the Chippewa is silent with respect to taxation; (2) the Buck 
Act, passed six years earlier in 1947, expressly stated that it 
was not to be read as authorizing taxation of "any Indian not 
otherwise taxed," 4 U.S.C. § 109, which language js "explicable 
only if Congress assumed that the States lacked the power to 
impose ••• taxes without special authorization." McClanahan, 
no 
411 u.s., at 177; (3) there is/express grant of taxjng power jn · 
either the language of P.L. 280 or its legislative history; that 
immunity which Congress so carefully preserved in prjor statutes 
like the Buck Act would not have been swept aside without specjfic 
(':::::1 notation; (4) P.L. 280, according to its legislative h:i story, is 
to be read as a "law and order" statute, designed to shift 
responsibility for adjudication from tribal courts to state courts; 
it is a modest solution to the specific problem of the inadequacy 
of law enforcement in some areas of Indian country. Finally, the 
question of whether P.L. 280 authorizes the levy of personal 
income or property taxes on Indians within reservations was 
specifically reserved in McClanahan. 
4. DISCUSSION: The only decision relied upon by Minn. SC 
squarely 
as/on point is Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F.Supp. 421 
(D. Neb. 1974). It has since been affirmed by CA 8. 516 F.2d 133. 
Peters involved Nebraska's assertion of taxjng power over the 
personal income earned on the reservation by Indians resjding 
-5-
therein. Nebraska, like Minnesota, is a listed state under § 1360 
(a) • Distinguishing McClanahan on the ground that Arizona does not 
come within§ 1360, CA 8's reasoning tracked that of the Minn. SC: 
to give "civil laws ••• of general application" the same force 
and effect within Indian country is plainly to embrace personal 
income tax laws. That§ 1360(b) granted a specific tax exemption 
as to trust property shows Congress' awareness that state revenue 
laws were among those which would become applicable to Indians by 
virtue of the breadth of§ 1360(a). 516 F.2d at 137. 
- - namely;-
G 
Petr is correct in stating that McClanahan reserved the very 
question presented, 411 U.S., at 178, n. 18,/that on the assumption 
that a state is within the reach of § 1360, does that sectjon 
empower taxation of Indians living on the reservation. Whether or 
not CA 8 and the Minn. SC are correct, I would rate this a candid~te 
for cert: (1) a decision would have broad applicabiljty to 
personalty, income, and other non-trust-property taxes (see petn 
Indians 
at 23-24) with respect to/living on reservations within the reach 
of § 1360; (2) since under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
those tribes not embraced by § 1360 now have the choice (as 
opposed to the states) of subjecting themselves to state civil 
and criminal jurisdiction (25 U.S.c. §§ 1321 & 1322), this Court 
~ . should settle the tax implications involved in that choice. 
\_ . 
There is no response; it has been 
8/19/75 Mason 
waived. A 
L-')cb· JJI/J{J /IUtiJl 1/:Zc,A1. {.j MJ•f'l~l' ·-: .. ::t;.-~ ,c A f# 
Minn. SC opin ~etn 
c-~~-~ 
Aucu•1 1!'1, 1953 
[H. R, 1063) 
P.L. 83-280, 
67 Stat. 588 
lnd.iona. 
Stat • jurjs<Jic• 
tion over cnm.Jnal 
offenaea. 
AN ACT 
To ._..i<•r jurisdiction ott tlH• ~tall'~ of Callforuin, ~ .esotu, l'><'llrn~kn, OrP~on. 
UIIO "'h<(•onHill, \dill ri'SJI\'('1 to critllllllll o!Tt•IJSI '<' 1111(! ch·iJ !'llii~I'R or U<'llon 
contmitt<·u or uri~<ing ou Jnuian n· s<· n·utlon~ within IHH:ll 1->tutcs, und fur 
othPr Jturpvs<•s. 
Be it rnartrd by tlt e ,<...'crw ff' w1d llouse of Rrpl'r>Xc11tativ<'!i of the 
Vnitu!State« of A111n·iea in Cou_qress assemblr.d, That chapter 53 of 
title 18, Unit(•d ·States Code, is herpuy amended by inserting at the 
end of tl1e d1apter analysis JH'CCPoing section 1151 of such title tbe 
following llew Jtern: 
"lJG:.!. StutP jnris<liction on·r ofTenst'S <·vlltlU!tt<·d IJ~· or a;;Jt!ust lndinns in the 
lu<linn <'vllntry.'' · 
SEc. 2. Title 18, United States Code, is ltereby amended by insert-
ing in cltapter 53 tberNf imuwdiately after section llGl a new section, 
to ue designated as section 1162, as follows: 
"§ 11G:2. State juri.diction over offenses committed by or against 
Indians in the Indian country 
"(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the 
areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the 
!:iame extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses committed 
elsewl1ere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall 
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they 
have elsewhere within the State: 
"State of Indian eonntry nlfl'cted 
California ______________ . All Indi11n country within the State 
Miunesotll _______________ All Indinn country within the State, except the Red 
I.11ke Rescn·ntion 
NeiJraska _______________ . All Indian country within the State 
Oregon----------------- · All Indian country within tiJe State, except tbp V>arm 
Springs Heservation 
'Wisconsin _______________ All Indian eountry within the Stute, except the 
Menominee Reservation 
"(b) Nothing in this section shn.ll authorize the alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water 
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or com-
munity that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a 
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall 
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner incon-
sistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any 
ref_,rulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or 
any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or 
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with 
respect to huntin~, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or 
regulation thereot. 
"(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall 
not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in sub-
section (a) of this section." 
SEc. 3. Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is hereby 
amended by inserting at the end of the chapter analysis preceding 
section 1331 of such title the following new item: 
"13GO. Stl!te civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians nre parties." 
SEc. 4. Title 28, United States Code, is hereby a~ended by inserting 
in chapter 85 thereof immediately after section 1359 a new section, to 
be designated as section 1360, as follows: 
"§ 1360. State civil jurisdiction in ·actions to which Indians are 
parties 
"(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to ·which 
Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed 
opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has 
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of 
such State that are of general application to private persons or private 
property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian 
country as they have elsewhere within the State: 
"State or Intllan country 111fected 
California ________ All Indian country within the State 
:'lllnnesota ________ All Indian country within the State, except the Hed Lake 
HesPrYutlon 
:'\chru~ka ________ , All Indian country within the State 
Ore~-:on ___________ All Indian <·ountry within the State, exct>pt the Warm Springs 
HPsenn t ion 




tion over civil 
causea. 
Repeal. 
P. L. 280 (cont.) 
"(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encum-
brance, or t:.lXation of any real or perso nal propertY., including water 
rights, belonging to any Indian or any I!l(lian tnbe, band, or com-
munity that is held in trust hy the United States or is subject to a 
r.:>striction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall 
authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner incon-
sistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any 
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon 
the State to adjudJcaLc, in probate proceed ings or otherwise, the owner-
ship or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. 
"(c) Any tribal ordinn.nce or custom heretofore or hereafter 
adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any 
authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any 
applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the 
determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section." 
SEc. fi. Section 1 of tlH• Act of OctoLer fl. Hl4!) (U:-l Stat. 70f,, ch. 
G04). is hereby re1wal.:>d, but sucl1 repeal sl1all not affec:t any pro-
ceedings heretofore instituted 1111<ler that section. 
Toxationofprot>"" 
erty, etc. 
Rem oval of legal 
impediment. 
SEC. u. Notwithstanding the proYisions of any EnaLling Act for the 
admission of a State, th.:> eonsent of il1e United States is hen•by :.rinn 
to the people of any State to amend, where necessa ry, their State con-
stitution or .:>xisting statutes, as the casC' may be, to remon any h·:.ral 
impe<lim.:>nt to the assumption of ei,•il and criminal juris<lirtion in 
atconlanc.:> \Yith the provisio11S of this Act: PTo1'i.ded. That the pro-
Yisions of this Act shall not h<'com.:> effective with resp<'ct to surh 
assumption of juri sd iction by any su('h State until the people thereof 
have appropriately amended tlteir State constitution or statutes as 
the case may be. 
Consent of U. S, 
to other States. SEC. 7. The consent of the United States is hereby given to any 
other State not ha\'ing jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses 
or civil causes of action, or with respect to Loth, as provided for in 
this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such ti111e and in such manner as 
the people of the State shall, by affirmative le;.rislative action, oLligate 
and bind the State to assumption then·of. 
Approved August 15, 1953. 
28 USCA §1323 (Supp. 1975): 
§ 1323. Retrocession or jurisdiction by State 
(a) The United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any 
State of all or any mE'asure of the criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, 
acquired by such State pursuant to the provisions of section 1162 of Title 
18, section 1360 of Title 28, or section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 
StaL 58&), as It was In effect prior to Its rE'peal by subsection (b) of 
this section. 
(b) Section 7 o! the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588). Is hereby 
repealed, but such repeal shall not affect any cession of jurisdiction made 
pursuant to such section prior to Its repeal. 
note repeal 
c-of P.L. 280, 
§7. 
Pub.L. 90-28{, Title IV, § 403, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79. 
:~ · ··,:1 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Carl Schenker 
DATE: April 17, 1976 
No. 75-5027 Bryan v. Itasca County 
I recommend reversal. 
This is a you-pays-your-money-and-you-takes-your-choice 
case. I choose the Indians. 
Basic "Indian law" is that states may not tax Indians 
without congressional authorization. If there is such 
authorization here, Congress gave it in an off-hand fashion. 
It seems to me more likely that the Indians are correct in 
contending that Congress intended only (i) to confer state 
court jurisdiction to resolve civil disputes, and (ii) to 
designate a choice-of-law principle. Congress probably was 
not aware of how carefully it might have to draw a protective 
clause because of the ill-developed state of Indian tax law 
in 1957. I am somewhat confirmed in my view by the state's 
argument consisting of nothing but "plain language" points. 
Carl 
ss 
c.,r. .J.o IV~ ¥ l:.f-
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RUSSELL B~AN, petitioner v. ITASCA CO'trf"..JTY, MINNESOTA, 
respondent 
O N PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF MINNESOTA 
No. 75-5027 D ecided June __ , 1976 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
T his case presents the question reserved in McClanahan v. 
A r i zona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S . 164, 178 n. 18 (1973): 
whether the grant of civil jurisdiction to the States conferred by § 4 
ofPublicLaw280, 72Stat590 , 28U.S.C . § 1360, isaCongres-
s ional grant of power to the States to tax reservation Indians except 
i nsofar as taxation is expressly excluded by the terms of the statute. 
Petitioner Russell Bryan, an enrolled member of the 
1_/ 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, resides in a mobile home on land held 
... 7"' -
in trust for the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech Lake Reservation in .. -
Minnesota. In June of 1972, petitioner received notices from the 
auditor of respondent Itasca County, Minnesota that he had been 
assessed personal property tax liability on the mobile home totaling 
$14 7 . 95 . Thereafter, in September, 1972, petitioner brought this 
s uit in the Minnesota District Court seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the state and county were without authority to levy such a tax on 
p ersonal property of a reservation Indian on the reservation and that 
i mposition of such a tax was contrary to federal law. The Minnesota 
District Court rejected the contention and entered judgment for 
- 2 -
respondent County. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, 
Minn. __ , 228 N. W. 2d 249 (1975). We granted certiorari, 
u.s. (1975), and now reverse. 
I 
Principles defining the power of States to tax reservation 
Indians and their property and activities on federally established 
reservations were codified in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). As summarized in its companion 
case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), 
McClanahan established the principle that: 
"[I]n the special area of state taxation absent cession 
of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, 
there has been ll£.Satisfactory autho:_ity for t~ing 
Indian reservation 1ands or Tnd'ian inCome from activ-
ities carried on within'1Ii';"'5oundaires o"I the reserva-
tion, and McClanahan ... lays to rest any doubt in 
this respect by holding that such taxation is not 
permissible absent Congressional consent. " Mes calera 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 148. ?:...! 
McClanahan held that Arizona was dis a bled in the absence of Congres -
sional consent from imposing a state income tax on the income of a 
reservation Indian earned solely on the reservation. On the authority 
of McClanahan, Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 
u.s. __ , ( 1976), held this Term that in the absence of Congres-





tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members living on the 
reservation, or a vendor license fee applied to a reservation 
Indian conducting a business for the Tribe on reservation land, 
or a sales tax as applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to 
Indians. 
Thus McClanahan and Moe preclude any authority in respondent 
County to levy a personal property tax upon petitioner's mobile home 
in the absence of Congressional consent. Our task therefore is to 
determine whether § 4 of Public Law 280, 28 U.S. C. § 1360, consti-
tutes such consent. 
Subsection (a) of§ 4, 28 U.S. C. § 1360(a), provides: 
"Each of the States ... listed ... shall have 
jurisdiction over civil causes of action between 
Indians or to which Indians are parties which 
arise in the areas of Indian country listed ..• 
to the same extent that such State ... has juris-
diction over other civil causes of action, and those 
civil laws of such State ... that are of general 
application to private persons or private property 
shall have the same force and effect within Indian 
country as they have elsewhere within the State .. 
Minnesota All Indian Country within the ::;tate, 
except the Red Lake Reservation" 
The st~~=.te does not in terms provide that the tax laws of a State are - - -among "civil laws ... of general application to private persons or 








~·,;'·~ ~ .. 
~· .. ?':..: ·t{. 
... ., ~ 
., ~ ....... . 
~·; . 





... • t._,~ • 
·~ .. 
- 4 -
that they were included, finding in § 4(b) of the statute a negative - - -
implication of inclusion in § 4(a) of a general power of tax. Section 
A ,__, ~ ..__---...._... CUI 4 
4(b) provides: 
"Nothing in this section shall authorize the 
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real 
or personal property, including water rights, be-
longing to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community that is held in trust by the United States 
or is subject to a restriction against alienation im-
posed by the United States; or shall authorize regu-
lation of the use of such property in a manner in-
consistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or 
statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; 
or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudi-
cate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the 
ownership or right to possession of such property or 
any interest therein. 11 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that "unless paragraph (a) is 
interpreted as a general power to tax, the exceptions contained in 
paragraph (b) are limitations on a non-existent power." __ Minn., 
'}_/ 
at __ , 228 N. W. 2d, at Therefore, the State Court held 
"Public Law 280 is a clear grant of power to tax," __ Minn., at 
_!lj 
__ , 228 N. W. 2d, at We disagree. That conclusion is fore--
closed by the legislative history of Public Law 280 and the application ___ ....,,._. 
=-" ,_. ... - -
of canons of construction applicable to Congressional statutes claitned 
to terminate Indian immunities. 
II 
The primary concern of Congress in enacting Public Law 280 
that clearly emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the 
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the 
absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement. See 
Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over 
Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L.A. L. Rev. 535, 541-542 (1975). The 
House Report expressly states: 
11 Thes e States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians 
for most offenses committed on Indian reservations or 
other Indian country, with limited exceptions. The 
applicability of Federal criminal laws in States having 
Indian reservations is also limited. The United States 
district courts have a measure of jurisdiction over 
offenses comrnitted on Indian reservations or other 
Indian country by or against Indians, but in cases of 
offenses committed by Indians against Indians that juris-
diction is limited to the so-called 10 major crimes: 
murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent 
to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, 
robbery, and larceny. 
11As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and 
order among the Indians in the Indian country has been 
left largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many 
States, tribes are not adequately organized to perform. 
that function; consequently, there has been created a 
hiatus in law-enforcement authority that could best be 
remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on States 
indicating an ability and willingness to accept such respon-
sibility. II 
'}_I 
H. R. Rep. 848, 8 3d Cong. , 1st Ses s. 5-6 ( 195 3). Thus, provision 
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Indians on the reservations was the central focus of Public Law 280 
fl.. I 
and is embodied in§ 2 oftheAct, 18 U.S.C. § 1162. 
In marked contrast is the virtual 
sional policy or intent in the legislative history respecting § 4' s grant 
of civil jurisdiction to the States. Of special significance for our pur-
poses, however, is the total absence of any mention or discussion 
regarding a Congressional intent to confer upon the States an authority 
to tax Indians or Indian property on Indian reservations. Neither 
7_1 
Report nor floor discussion in either House mentions such authority. 
This omission has significance in the application of the canons of con-
struction applicable to statutes affecting Indian immunities, as some 
mention would normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the 
status of tribal government and reservation Indians had been contem-
~/ 
plated by Congress. The only mention of taxation authority is in a 
colloquy between Mr. Sellery, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and Congressman Young during House committee hearings 
on Public Law 280. That colloquy strongly suggests that Congress did 
not mean to grant tax authority to the States: 
"Mr. Young. Does your bill limit the provision for 
Federal assistance to States in defraying the increased 
expenses of the courts in connection with the widening 
of the jurisdiction that the bill encompasses? 
Mr. Sellery. No; it does not. 
Mr. Young. Do you think it would be necessary to 
provide for some payment, inasmuch as the great por-
















Mr. Sellery. . .. Generally, the Department's 
views are that if we started on the processes of 
Federal financial assistance or subsidization of law 
enforcement activities among the Indians, it might 
turn out to be a rather costly program, and it is a 
problem which the States should deal with and accept 
without Federal financial assistance; otherwise there 
will be some tendency, the Department believes, for 
the Indian to be thought of and perhaps to think of 
himself because of the financial assistance which 
comes from the Federal Government as still somewhat 
a member of a race or group which is set apart from 
other citizens of the State. And it is desired to give 
him and the other citizens of the State the feeling of a 
conviction that he is in the same status and has access 
to the same services, including the courts, as other 
citizens of the State who are not Indians. 
Mr. Young. That would not quite be true, though; 
would it? Because for the most part he does not pay 
any taxes. 
Mr. Sellery. No. There is that difference. 
Mr. Young. A rather sizable difference in not pay-
ing for the courts or paying for the increased expenses 
for judicial proceedings. 
Mr. Sellery. The Indians, of course, do pay other 
forms of taxes. I do not know how the courts of Nevada 
are supported financially, but the Indians do pay the 
sales tax and other taxes. 
Mr. Young. But no income tax or corporation tax 
or profits tax. You understand a large portion of the 
land is held in trust and therefore is not subject to tax. 
Mr. Sellery. That is correct. 
Mr. Young. So far as my State is concerned, it 
would be a large burden on existing costs of judicial 
procedure. I think it is only right that the Federal 
Government should make some contribution for that. 
You seem to differentiate. I think there is a differen-
tiation, too, in that they are not paying taxes. 
Mr. Sellery. I will concede your point that they are 
not paying taxes. The Department has recomm.ended, 
nevertheless, that no financial assistance be afforded to 

















Piecing together as best we can the sparse legislative 
history of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended 
to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private 
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and 
other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide 
such disputes; this is definitely the import of the statutory wordin g 
conferring upon a State 11 jurisdiction over civil causes of action be-
tween Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in ... 
Indian country ... to the same extent that such State ... has 
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action. 11 With this as the pri-
mary focus of§ 4(a), the wording that follows in§ 4(a) -- 11 and those 
civil laws of such State ... that are of general application to private 
persons or private property shall have the same force and effect 
within Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State 11 --
authorizes application by the State courts of their rules of decision to 
lQ.I 
decide such disputes. Compare 28 U.S. C. § 1652. 
U) 
Th~s canst rue -
tion *nds support in the consistent and uncontradicted references in 
the legislative history to 11 permitting State courts to adjudicate civil 
controversies'' arising on Indian reservations, H. R. Rep. 848, at 
5, 6 (emphasis added), and the complete absence of anything remotely 
resembling an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control 
.!.1./ 
over Indian reservations. In short, the consistent and exclusiv e 
,. 
' 





use of the terms "civil cause of action," "arising in," "civil laws 
of general application to private persons and private property, 11 and 
"adjudica t[ion), " in both the Act and its legislative history virtually 
compel our conclusion that the primary intent was to grant juris-
diction over litigation involving reservation Indians in state court. 
Furthermore, certain tribal reservations were completely 
exempted from the provisions of Public Law 280 precisely becaus e 
each had a "tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a 
]1_/ 
reasonably satisfactory manner." H. R. Rep. 848, at 7. Con gress 
plainly meant only to allow state courts to decide criminal and cidl 
matters arising on reservations not so organized. Accordingly, 
rather than the expansive reading given § 4(a) by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, the construction we give the section is much more 
consonant with the revealed congressional intent:. Moreover, our 
construction is consistent with our prior references to § 4 as "the 
extension of state jurisdiction over causes of action arising in Indian 
country." Kennerly v . District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 427 
(1971). See also, id., at 424 n. 1; id., at 430-432 (STEWART, J., 
dissenting); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm., 380 
U.S. 685,687, n. 3(1965);MenomineeTribcv. U.S., 391U.S. 404, 
416, n. 8 ( 1968) (STEW ART , J. , dissenting). Our construction is 









25 U.S. C. §§ 1321-1326. Title IV repeals§ 7 of Public Law 280 
and requires tribal consent as a condition to further state assump-
tions of the jurisdiction provided in 18 U.S. C. § 1162 and 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1360. Section 402 of Title IV, 25 U.S. C. § 1322, tracks verbatim 
the language of § 4 of Public Law 280. Section 406 of Title IV, 25 
U.S. C. § 1326, which provides for Indian consent, refers to "State 
jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with respect to 
criminal offenses or civil causes of action •... 11 It is true, of 
course, that the primary interpretation of § 4 must have reference 
to the legislative history of the Congress that enacted it rather than 
to the history of Acts of a later Congress. Nevertheless, Title IV 
of the 1968 Act is intimately related to § 4, as it provides the method 
for further state assumptions of the jurisdiction conferred by § 4. 
We have construed the effect of legislation affecting reservation 
Indians in light of "intervening" legislative enactments, Moe v. 
Confederated Salish and Kootenaj Tribes, U.S., at __ , and it 
would be paradoxical to suppose that Congress intended the meaning 
of § 4 to vary depending upon the time and method by which particular 
States acquired jurisdiction. Certainly the legislative history of 
Title IV makes it difficult to construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired pur-
suant to Title IV as extending State general civil regulatory po\ver, 







who offered and principally sponsored Title IV, see Kennerly v. 
District Court of Montana, 400 U.S., at 42 9 n. 5, referred to § 1360 
civil jurisdiction as follows: 
"Certainly representatives of municipalities 
have charged that the repeal of Public Law 280 
would hamper air and water pollution controls and 
provide a haven for undesirable, unrestricted 
business establishments within tribal land borders. 
Not only does this assertion show the lack of faith 
that certain cities have in the ability and desire of 
Indian tribes to better themselves and their environ-
ment, but, 1nost importantly, it is irrelevant, since 
Public Law 280 relates primarily to the application 
of state civil and criminal law in court proceedings, 
and has no bearing on programs set up by the States 
to assist economic and environmental development 
in Indian territory. 11 (emphasis added) 
III 
Other considerations also support our construction. Today' s 
Congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than 
in 1953 favor their assimilation but Public Law 280 was plainly not 
meant to effect total assimilation. Public Law 280 was only one of 
many types of assimilationist legislation under active consideration 
in 1953. H. R. Rep. 848, at 3-5; Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kin g s 
D.. I 
County, No. 74-1565, Slip op. at 10 (CA 9, Nov. 3, 1973). And 
nothing in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant 
the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the 















a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than "'private, 
.;, 
voluntary organizations, "' United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 
557 (1975) --
subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory powers, including 
.!±I 
taxation, of state and local governments. The Act itself refutes 
such an inference: there is notably absent any conferral of state ,. 
,,. 
jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, and § 4(c), 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1360(c), providing for the "full force and effect" of any tribal ordi-
nances or customs "heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian 
tribe ... if not inconsistent with any applicable law of the State" 
]2_/ 
contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal government. 
Moreover, the same Congress that enacted Public Law 280 
}J:_/ 
also enacted several tennination Acts, legislation which is cogent 
proof that Congress knows well how directly to express its intent 
when that intent is to subject Indians to the full sweep of state laws 
and state taxation. Cf. Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 
705, 713 (1943); Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906). These 
termination enactments provide expressly for subjecting distributed 
property "and any income derived therefrom by the individual, corpora-
tion or other legal entity, to the same taxes, state and federal, as in 
the case of non-Indians," 25 U.S. C. § 564j; 25 U.S. C. § 749; 25 U.S. C. 
§ 898, and provide that "all statutes of the United States which affect 
- 13 -
Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable 
to members of the tribe, and the laws of the several states shall apply 
to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other 
citizens or persons within their jurisdiction. 11 25 U.S. C. § 564q; 
25 U.S. C. § 757; 25 U.S. C. § 899; cf., 25 U.S. C. § 726. These con-
temporaneous termination Acts are in pari materia with Public Law 
280. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 3 91 U.S. , at 411. Reading 
this express language respecting state taxation and application of the 
full range of state laws to tribal members of these contemporaneous 
termination Acts, the negative inference is that Congress did not mean 
in section 4(a) to subject reservation Indians to state taxation. Thus 
rather than the negative implication, found by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in the exclusion of certain taxation by § 4(b), of a grant of 
general taxing power in § 4(a), we conclude that these Acts in pari 
materia with Public Law 280 show that if Congress in enacting Public 
Law 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory 
powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have 
expressly said so. 
IV 
Additionally, we note that § 4(b), excluding 11taxation ... of 















tribe ... that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to 
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States," is 
not obviously the narrow exclusion of state taxation which the 
.\ 
Minnesota Supreme Court read it to be. On its face the statute i s 
not clear whether the exclusion is applicable only to taxes levied 
directly on the trust property specifically, or whether it also excludes 
~. 
taxation on activities taking place in conjunction with such property 
'·· 
and income deriving from its use. And even if read narrowly to apply 
only to taxation levied against trust property directly, § 4(b) certainly 
does not expressly authorize all other state taxation of reservation 
Indians. 
Moreover, the express prohibition of any "alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation" of any trust property can be read as a prohibition 
on the state courts acquiring jurisdiction over civil controversies in- •. 
volving reservation Indians pursuant to § 4, from applying state la\vs 
or enforcing judgments in ways that would effectively result in the 
11 alienation, encumbrance, or taxation" of trust property. Indeed, any 
other reading of this provision of § 4(b) is difficult to square with the 
identical prohibition contained in § 2 (b) of the Act, which applies the 
same restrictions upon state courts exercising criminal jurisdiction ' . 
over reservation Indians. It would silnply make no sense to infer from. 
the identical language of § 2 (b) a general power in § 2 (a) to tax Indians 
in all other respects since § 2 (a) deals only with criminal jurisdiction. 
'•· 
- 15 -
Indeed, § 4(b) in its entirety may be read as simply a 
reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government 
relationship in all respects save the conferral of state court juris-
diction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving Indians. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that § 4(b) is 
" entirely consistent with, and in effect is a reaffirmation of, the law 
a s it stood prior to its enactment. 11 Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F. 2d 
8 63, 865-866 (1957). The absence of more precise language respect-
i ng state taxation of reservation Indians is entirely consistent with a 
general uncertainty in 1953 of the precise status and limits of state 
p ower to tax reservation Indians respecting other than their trust 
property, and a congressional intent merely to reaffirm the existing 
J:.Jj 
l aw whatever subsequent litigation might determine it to be. 
Finally, in construing this "admittedly ambiguous statute, 11 
Board of County Comm 1 rs v. Seber, 318 U.S., at 713, we must be 
guided by that "eminently sound and vital canon, 11 Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe v . Hollo'v\'breast, __ U.S. __ , __ n. 7 (1976), that "statutes 
pas sed for the benefit of Indian tribes are to be liberally construed, 
doubtful expressions being resolved in their favor. 11 Alaska Pacific 
Fisheries v. United States, 78, 89 (1918). See Choate v. Trapp, 224 
U. S . 665, 675 (1912); Antojne v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 -2 00 







in the face of claims that ambiguous statutes abolish by implication 
Indian tax immunities. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm' n, 
411 U.S., at 174; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-367 (1930). This is so be-
cause Indians stand in a special relationship to the federal 
government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress 
has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow 
states to treat Indians as part of the general community." Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 613-614 (1943) (Murphy, 
J., dissenting). What we recently said of a claim that Congress had 
terminated an Indian reservation by means of an ambiguous statute is 
equally applicable here to the respondent's claim that § 4(a) of Public 
Law 280 is a "clear grant of power to tax," and hence a termination of 
traditional Indian imm.unity from state taxation: 
"Congress was fully aware of the means by which 
termination could be effected. But clear termination 
language \\' as not employed in the . . . Act. This 
being so, we are not inclined to infer an intention to 
terminate . . . . A congressional determination to 
terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or 
be clear from the surrounding circumstances and 
legislative history." Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 
504-505 (1973). 
The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
reversed. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a federally recognized 
tribe with a constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 2 n. 2. 
Its reservation was established by the Treaty of February 22, 1855, 
10 Stat. 1165. 
?:..I 
The McClanahan principle derives from general preemption 
analysis, 411 U.S. , at 172, that gives effect to the plenary and ex-
elusive power of the federal government to deal with Indian tribes, 
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 n. 11 ( 1975); Morton v . 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-552 (1974); Board of County Comm'rs v . 
Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943), and to "regulate and protect Indians 
and their property against interference even by a state," Board of 
County Comm' rs v. Seber, supra, at 715. This preemption analysis 
· draws support from the '"backdrop' of the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine, " Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, u.s. 
__ , ( 1976), '"the policy of leaving Indians free from state juris-
diction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the nation's history,"' 
McClanahan, supra, at 168, and the extensive federal legislative and 
administrative regulation of Indian tribes and reservations, id., at 
173-179. "Congress has ... acted consistently on the assumption 
', .. 
'• 
··. " ... "'' 
• t 
' ' 




that the states have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a 
reservation, 11 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), and 
therefore 111 state laws generally are not applicable on an Indian 
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State 
laws shall apply. '" McClanahan, supra, at 170-171 (quoting U.S. 
Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 ( 1958)). 
Of course, this preemption model usually yields different con-
elusions as to the application of state laws to tribal Indians who have 
left or never inhabited federally established reservations, or Indians 
"who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government, 11 
McClanahan, supra, at 167-168; see Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, 
at 148-149. 
The State Supreme Court relied upon Oma ha Tribe of Indians 
v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421, aff'd 516 F. 2d 133 (8th Cir.), v/here the 
Di strict Court for the District of Nebraska gave the same construc tion 
to Public Law 280 in upholding a state income tax levi ed against re ser-
vation Indian income. 
Petitioner had not properly raised a claim that his mobile 
home was in fact annexed to tribal trust land and therefore a part of 
the real property expressly excluded from taxation by § 4(b) . The 
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' • .~ 
FN- 3 
Minnesota Supreme Court found, however, that the mobile home was 
personal property taxable as such under Minnesota law. 
§_I 
The House Report, H. R. Rep. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 
( 1953), and the Senate Report, S. Rep. 699, 83d Cong. , 1st Ses s. 
(1953), are in all material respects identical. All citations herein 
are to the House Report. 
~I 
Section 2 of Public Law 280, 18 U.S. C. § 1162, provides: 
"State jurisdiction over offenses committed 
by or against Indians in the Indian country. 
(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the 
following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian 
country listed opposite the name of the State or Terri-
tory to the same extent that such State or Territory has 
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within 
the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such 
State or Territory shall have the same force and effect 
within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within 
the State or Territory: 
State or 
Territory of Indian country affected 
Minnesota------- All Indian country within the State, 
except the Red Lake Reservation. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the 
alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or 














to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community that is held in trust by the United 
States or is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or 
shall authorize regulation of the use of such 
property in a manner inconsistent with any 
Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with 
any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall 
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, 
or community of any right, privilege, or im-
munity afforded under Federal treaty, agree-
ment, or statute with respect to hunting, 
trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, 
or regulation thereof. 
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 
1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable 
within the areas of Indian country listed in sub-
section (a) of this section as areas over which 
the several States have exclusive jurisdiction. 11 
]_I 
99 Gong. Rec. 9962, 10782, 10928 (1953). 
§_/ 
See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty 
and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. Rev. 267, 292 (1973). 
Jj 
Unpublished Transcript of Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
83d Gong., lst Sess. (1953). The transcript was produced by the 
United States during the briefing of Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U.S. 
451 (1973). The portion quoted in the text is reproduced in the Appendix 
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Cf. , Israel & Smithson, supra note __ , at 2 96: 
"A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that 
Congress never intended 'civil laws' to mean the entire 
array of state non-criminal laws, but rather that 
Congress intended 'civil laws' to mean those laws which 
have to do with private rights and status, Therefore, 
'civil laws . , , of general application to private persons 
or private property' would include the laws of contract, 
tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc. , but 
would not include laws declaring or implementing the 
states' sovereign powers, such as the power to tax, grant 
franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning 
of 'private' laws." 
.!.!_/ 
Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the title 
of Public Law 280: "A bill to confer jurisdiction on the States .. , , 
with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed 
or arising on Indian reservations within such states, and for other 
purposes" (the other purposes being § 5' s withdrawal from the affected 
areas of the operation of the Federal Indian Liquor Laws, and § § 6-7's 
provision of a method whereby additional States could assume civil and 
criminal jurisdictions over Indian reservations). Additionally, this 
interpretation is buttressed by § 4(c), which provides that "any tribal 
ordinance or custom , .. adopted by an Indian tribe ... in the exer-
cise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with 
any applicable civil law of the state, be given full force and effect in the 
determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section" (emphasis 
" " 
FN- 6 
added). Finally, reading § 4(a) as an integrated whole, with the 
reference to state civil law as intended to provide the rules of 
decision for the private civil causes of action over which state courts 
were granted jurisdiction is consistent with § 3 of Public Law 280, 
which codifies § 4 in Title 28 of the United States Code. That Title 
collects acts of Congress governing jurisdiction and the judiciary. 
Section 4 would be expected to be codified in Title 25, governing 
Indian affairs if general state regulatory power over Indian reserva-
tions were being granted. Indeed, § 4 is entitled, as provided in 
Public Law 280 and codified at 28 U.S. C. § 1360, "State jurisdiction 
in actions to which Indians are parties. 11 
Tribal groups in the affected states which were exempted 
from the coverage of Public Law 280 because they had "reasonably 
satisfactory law -and-order 11 organizations, had objected to the ext en-
sion of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on various grounds. Three 
of the tribes exempted objected due to their fear of inequitable treat-
ment of reservation Indians in state courts. H. R. Rep. 848, at 7-8. 
Two of the objecting tribes expressed the fear that 11the extension of 
state law to their reservations would result in the loss of various 
rights. 11 Id., at 8. One tribe objected on the ground that its members 












abolition of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation, except 
insofar as expressly excluded, was an anticipated result of Public 
Law 280 1 s extension of civil jurisdiction, vehement Indian objections 
on this specific ground would also have been voiced. 
The legislative history of Public Act 280 does contain a 
congressional expression that "the Indians of several states have .... 
reached a stage of acculturation and deyelopment that makes desirable 
the extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country. H. R. 
Rep. 848, at 6. But not too much can be made of this unelaborated 
statement; its thrust is too difficult to reconcile with the focus of 
Public Law 280 -- extending state jurisdiction to those reservations 
with the least developed and most inadequate tribal legal institutions; 
presumably those tribes evincing the least "acculturation and develop-
ment11 in terms of the mainstream of American society. See Goldberg, 
'-
Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation 
Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 543 (1975). 
Much has been written on the subject of a possible devastating ·. 
r. 
effect on tribal governments that might result from an interpretation of 
§ 4 as conferring upon state and local governments general civil regula-
tory control over reservations Indians. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. 
FN- 8 
Kings County, No. 74-1565, Slip op. at 7-8, 11-13 (CA 9, Nov. 3, 
1975); Goldberg, supra note __ , Note, The extension of County 
Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians in California: Public Law 280 
and the Ninth Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451 ( 1974); Comment, Indian 
Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1261 ( 1971). The suggestio.1,1 is that, since tribal governments 
are disabled under many state laws from incorporating as local units 
of government, Goldberg, supra, at 581, general regulatory control 
might relegate tribal governments to a level below that of counties and 
municipalities, thus essentially destroying them, particularly if they 
might raise revenue only after the tax base had been filtered through 
many governmental layers of taxation. Present federal policy appears .• 
to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government. 
See, ~·, Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S. C. 
§ § 1451 et ~·; Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance 
Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S. C. § § 450 et ~·, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that ~:z!E&:tl1EDB 
D Z131 courts ''are not obligated in ambiguous circumstances to strain .• 
to implement a policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where 
to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what 
is, after all, an ongoing relationship. 11 Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. 
.• 
Kings County, supra, Slip op., at 12. 
,. 
I ·~ ..• 




See also, Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction over 
Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280 and the Ninth 
Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451, 1489 (1974). 
]j_/ 
68 Stat. 718, 25 U.S. C. § 564 (Klamath Tribe); 68 Stat. 
768, 25 U.S. C. § § 721-728 (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas); 
68 Stat. 1099, 25 U.S. C. §§ 741-760 (Paiute Indians of Utah); 68 Stat. 
250, 25 U.S. C. § § 891-901 (Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin). 
l]_/ 
Congress would be fully justified in 1953 in being uncertain 
as to state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation 
Indians. No decision of this Court directly resolved the is sue until 
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, u.s. __ , 
decided earlier this Term.. It appears that the only decision of this 
Court prior to 1953 dealing with state power to levy a personal property 
tax on reservation Indians was United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 
443-444 (1902), a case which held exempt from state taxation persona l 
Indian property purchased with federal funds. See United States Dept. 
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Please join me. 
On page 2, line 6, in place of "codified" 
would you consider "clarified" or "described," or perhaps 
some other verb? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Re: 75-5027 - Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
On page 2, line 6, in place of "codified" 
would you consider "clarified" or "described," or perhaps 
some other verb? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
i 
Sincerely, 
.ittpTtntt <ijcurt of t!rt 'J!fuittb ,itatts, 
._asftinghm. ~. <ij. 2Ll,;t.ll-~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 2, 1976 
Re: No. 75-5027, Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




Re: Bryan v. Itasca Cty, No. 75-5027 
You and I "split" on this case, which we both consider 
close. 
I think Brennan's opinion makes a good case for the result 
I prefer, although I am not persuaded by some of his individual 
arguments. It seems to me most important that the statute 
is too ambiguous to override the ~R general rule of nontaxation 
when there is no legislative history indicating that Congress 
intended to do so. 
On the other hand, each of the specific statutory text 
arguments that he makes has some weakness or other, because 
of the overall ambiguity of the case. It seems to me that the 
opinion might more effectively have eliminated these arguments 
because they provide the grist from which a ~ respectable 
dissent can be made. 
Overall, I would join if I were the Justice; but I believe 
you can adhere to your Conference vote. My understanding at 
present is that White will write so we would not have to do 
a dissent. If White changes his mind, of course, I'm ready 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.:§u:pTmu Qfllurt llf Ur~ '!lttit~b' ;§mutt 
Jfattfringtmt. ~. ~ 2ll~J!.&t 
June 4, 1976 
Re: No. 75-5027 - Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn. 
Dear Bill: 
I was the other way in this case but I 
shall acquiesce with a graveyard dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
June 4, 1976 
No. 75-5021 Baao v. Itasca Countx 
Dear Bill: l , 
I am follow~ my Brother White's capitulation to your 
persuasive powers! 




Mr. Jua tice Brennan 
~1'M 
lfp/ss 
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.Suprtntt atourt of tqt ~lt ~taitg 
'l\Tagfringtcn.lS. ar. 211.?'~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 4, 1976 
Re: No. 75-5027 -- Russell Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota 
Dear Bill: 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
~u:p-rtutt {Jftmrl ot tfrt 'J!lmub- ~tattg 
~Mfrmg:bm.to. (If. 2ll,?'!-.;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 75-5027 - Bryan v. Itasca County 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
~-





CHAMB E RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§u.pr mtt Qfonrf of tltt ~ili ?t ;§tab's 
'J.il:a<!pngt.o-n, ~. ~· 211.?J!~ ' 
June 7, 1976 
Re: 75-5027- Bryan v . Itasca County, Minnesota 
Dear Bi 11: 
/ 
Please join me in your circulation of June l. 
Regards, 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
-~uprtmt Qfcurl qf f!rt ~tb ~ta±t.e 
jlrasfringhm. ~. (!f. :W.;t'!' 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 7, 1976 
Re: No. 75-5027 - Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your circulation of June 1st. 
Sincerely, •A-
t11flrv· 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
·. 
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